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"WHEN OMER SMOTE 'IS BLOOMIN' LYRE"
JEROME N. FRANK t
THE views of an early seventeenth century English lawyer on the
doctrine of separation of governmental powers would not ordinarily
appear to be of much interest to the contemporary bar. But lawyers love
precedent, and the utterances of Edward Coke are rapidly coming to
be the keynote of a widespread criticism of our modern administrative
agencies. He won a great struggle, it is urged, in establishing the
supremacy of the judiciary by opposing the union of governmental
powers in the agencies of his day which, it is said, correspond to the com-
missions of our time. And his influence upon the fathers of our Consti-
tution was, it is asserted, tantamount to an enactment of his views into
the Constitution. It is perhaps not heretical to suggest that the thesis that
administrative agencies are bad was formulated first, and that Coke's
Institutes was consulted afterward, so that if a re-examination of the
famous 17th century feud between Coke and his sovereign demonstrates
its historical inaccuracy, the administrative agencies will not necessarily
be removed from attack. But many lawyers operate on the theory that
any kind of precedent-exposing pays dividends of some kind. With that
in mind, we may not find it wholly academic to venture into the realm
of history.
Coke, we are told, in the early part of the 17th century, valiantly led
the English lawyers and judges of his day in a fight to curb the despotism
of the first two Stuart kings, James I and Charles I. It is said that
-This article will appear as a chapter of a book entitled IF INEN WNNVE A NGELs, to be
published soon. The preceding chapter will discuss the historical accuracy and influence
of Montesquieu's description of the English government as divided into three separate
branches. The following chapter will deal with the relation of the doctrine of separation
of powers to constitutional "checks and balances."
It may be well to note that the present article is a historical essay, and should not
be taken as an evaluation of the practical effect or wisdom of a separation of powers;
such an evaluation will be attempted elsewhere in the forthcoming book.
-2 Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Formerly
General Counsel for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration; Special Counsel to
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in railroad reorganizatiun cases; Clairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission. Author of LAw AND THE Mo=' MIND tl93I),
SAVE A EmcA FrT (1938).
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in that fight Coke asserted the doctrine of judicial supremacy: that the
judges should be both independent of, and superior to, both the legis-
lative (Parliament) and the executive (the king). A wag might char-
acterize that doctrine, as ascribed to Coke, as one calling for "a govern-
ment of lawyers, and not of men."' It is said that Coke, in the contest
with the Crown, also assailed, as instruments of despotism or royal
absolutism, all administrative bodies, and vigorously opposed the merg-
ing in any one governmental agency of judicial and administrative powers.
And - so the story goes - the writings of Coke reporting that conflict
with the Crown had a vast influence in the shaping of the early Ameri-
can state constitutions and our Federal Constitution, for Coke's attitudes
were reinforced by the experiences of the American colonists in their
dealings with the English government. Thus we are asked to arrive
at this conclusion: Under Coke's influence, those American constitutions
exalted the courts and demeaned the legislature and the executive. And
- here we *come to current attacks on existing American administrative
agencies - those constitutions, it is said, embodied Coke's indignation
at the joinder of administrative and judicial functions. The Bills of
Rights in those constitutions, it is alleged, were accordingly motivated
by "a traditional jealousy of administrative activity;" they reflected, it
is said, Coke's deep distrust of the "administrative-judicial tribunals of
17th century England," the "administrative agencies of the Tudors and
Stuarts," with mixed powers, as reported "in Coke's Fourth Institute,"
which "was almost a bible when our Bills of Rights were framed."'
It is conceded, to be sure, that, long after Coke's death, as a result of
the English "bloodless revolution" of 1688, there was established, as the
basis of English constitutional law, the doctrine of the supremacy of
the legislature (Parliamentary sovereignty). But that development, we
are advised, had no effect on the thinking of our American statesmen in
the 18th century when the American constitutions were being adapted;
"the legal-political constitutional organization which we developed in
America" was based "on the ideas of common-law lawyers taken over
from 17th century England. Our constitutional ideas are those of the
1. "If, however, the law was to be supreme, and at the same time a mystery open
only to the initiated, it is clear that if the claim of the lawyers was to be admitted, the
supreme authority would be their exclusive possession." MCILWAIN, Tim Hiamn CoUnr
OF PARLIAMENT (1910) 80-81. "If this theory had been generally accepted, the judges
would have become the ultimate law givers of the realm . . 2' MAITLAND, CoNsiru-
TIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1908) 301.
2. See Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Late (Roscoe Pound,
Chairman) (1938) 63 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 331, 352 ct Seq.; PoUND,
CONTEMPORARY JURISTic THEORY (1940) 25 if; Pound, The Place of the Judiciary io
a Democratic Polity (1941) 27 A.B.A.J. 133; Cf. POUND, SPIRIT OF THE COMMON
LAW (1921) 60ff.
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Puritan Revolution, not of England after 16S8. " o The "age of Cohe
was the age of the puritan in England." 4 As a consequence, we are told,
in the state constitutions adopted after the Declaration of Independence,
the then contemporary English doctrine of legislative supremacy was
rejected, and peculiarly strong curbs were put on the exercise of execu-
tive functions. "Our own constitution was framed and ado opted under
the influence of that dread of royal power which had dictated the line
of English constitutional development during two preceding centuries.
The functions of the king in which the development had left him leat
fettered - the functions which remained to him after the sphere of
Parliament and the courts had been broken off - were those which our
Constitution assigned to what we call the executive department; and
hence the exercise of those functions mad the power of the officials in
whom they are vested are with us the most jealously hemmed in by
constitutional limitations." '
We may pass by, without extended discussion, the question of whether
Coke ever espoused the doctrine of judicial supremacy. His opinion in
Dr. Bonizham's Case8 contains language which some scholars have so
interpreted,7 but others disagree with that interpretation.8 some of them
3. PoUNt, Co dorA LO.v JURISTIC THEORy (1940) 2.5. But see the statement in
Poux, THE FoRaIATrw PERIOD OF Amtmw.\x LAw (1938) 41-42, that in the period
after independence, Americans were influenced by "the English llity after lt?&" which
made them "familiar with a sovereign legislature." It is interesting to ckntrast Pound%
present thesis With that of Vanderbilt, who says that our American d'rctrine of the
separation of powers was "inherited . . . from English experience" and "mas the out-
standing principle of the English Constitution in the eighteenth century." Vanderbilt,
Hearings before Senate Subcommittee of the Consinnttee on the Judiciary on S. 674,
S. 675 and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 1308. Vanderbilt, on the same ocea-
sion, said that the "doctrine of separation of powers is directed primarily to obtaining
the independence of the judiciary." But cf. Pargellis. Balanced Govr;:n:ent in T11r
CoNs uTirox REcoNsIDERED (Read's ed. 1938) 37, 3A.
4. Pound, Justice According to Law (1914) 14 CoL. L. REV. 1, 23; Pov:m, Tnu
SPIRIT or THE CommoN LAW (1921) 42.
5. DicriNsoN, ADInxIsmATIv JusTIcE .xri, THE Svr-n'.%s " oF" LAW (1927)
97. Dicdinson, in a later writing, seems to have abandoned that position; see Ciechs and
Balances (1932) 3 Excyc. Soc SCIENCES 363.
6. 8 Coke's Reports 114a.
7. See, e.g., MCILWAiN, THE HIGH COURTr OF PARLIAMENT (1910) 235 ff ; MAT-
LAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1903) 301; see also PAni, S 7ri
THE Commo. LAW (1921) 75; but see w,.hat appears to be an opposite view in Puu:.n,
IN-TERPRTATioNs OF LEGAL HISToaY (1923) 3. The difference may b2 exlainul-al-
though Pound does not so explain it-by the adoption of Melclain's thesis that C!:e
thought of Parliament primarily not as a legislative body but as the highest court in
England.
3. See, e.g., 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISn L.W 1924) 1P-.47; Th,,rne
The Constitution and the Courts: A Reexamination of the F'anosus Case of Dr. P,:l wn,
in THE CO NSTITUTION REcoNSIDERED (Read's ed. 1938) 15.
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pointing to the fact that Coke later, in his Fourth Institute said: "Of
the powers and jurisdiction of Parliament for the making of laws in
proceeding by bill, it is so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be
confined either for cases or persons within any bounds."'
At any rate, the suggestion that Coke is the embodiment of the ideas
of the Puritan Revolution is quaint: Coke was never a Puritan but a
member of the Anglican Church. True, in his later years, he allied
himself with tlfe Puritan party in Parliament. But Coke died in 1634,
and would almost surely, had he lived, have opposed the beheading of
Charles I in 1649. Cromwell, who had little patience with lawyers, would
not have brooked him as an adviser. Coke wanted to restore what he
considered the ancient ways and would have been horrified at the drastic
changes in governmental structure which occurred as a result of the
Revolution. Harrington, who reflected many of the views of that era,
says nothing of an independent judiciary. And, if Coke believed in
judicial supremacy, such an attitude was not shared by Puritan writers
of the revolutionary period such as Milton or Filmer1
Coke's alleged fight for an independent judiciary would, of course,
not prove that he urged judicial supremacy; England today has the
former but not the latter. But even the conventional story of Coke's
independence as a judge has been questioned. His own report,11 since
become famous, of a meeting with James I, in which Coke pictures
himself as courageously defying that monarch, is probably untrust-
worthy;12 there is evidence to the effect that, when James was angered
by some of Coke's remarks at that meeting, Coke "fell flat on all fower,"
and groveled before the king.1 3 And whatever may have been the reason
for Coke's later dismissal from the bench14 - where, some writers think,
he had been anything but a model of a dispassionate judge" -there is
9. 4 COKE'S INsT. 36. For divers views as to the meaning of that passage, see MCI.-
WAIN, op. cit. supra note 7; 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 8; Corwin, The 'lighcr
Law' Background of American Constitutional Law (1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 365, 374-
79; cf. 4 CoKE's INST. 25. And see GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TIIE DiEVulOlMFNT
OF LEGAL INSTITUnTIONS (1937) 744-45.
10. See MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926) 55.
11. 12 Coke's Reports 63b-65.
12. Usher, (1903) 18 ENG. HIST. REV. 664; cf. 2 USHER, REcoNSTRCTI'rO OF TIll.
ENGLISH CHURCH (1910) 312-16; USHER, Tim RISE AND FALL OF THE Hiii Com,-
MIS SON (1913) 188-90; 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF Extamsii LAW (1924) 430-31.
13. See authorities cited supra note 12.
14. There is some evidence that the dismissal was precipitated by a row between
Coke and the royal favorite over patronage. Cf. 1 JoHNsoN, TnE LIFE OF SIR EDWARD
COKE (1845) 328ff.
15. It has been said by divers writers that "Coke's temperament was passionate and
emotional rather than judicial;" that lie had a "proneness to maltreat precedents in
supporting his views;" and vacillated "in legal tenets when the interests of partisansh p
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no doubt whatever that, far from then fighting with the king, he spent
the next four years as a sycophant trying to regain the royal favor.
Only after his boot-licking efforts had failed, did Coke, in the later years
of his life, become one of the leaders, in Parliament, of the opposition
to the extensive prerogatives asserted by the Crown. The attitude he
took, as one of the authors of the Petition of Rights in 1628, toward
the king's prerogatives, flatly contradicted the views lie had expressed
when- as attorney general and as judge -he was not out of favitr
with the king. 6
Nevertheless, in colonial America, the legendary Coke was believed
in, and his opinion in Dr. Boidham's Case was cited by Otis in 1761
as authority for the position that unreasonable and oppressive legis-
lation was invalid and should be disregarded by the courts. 7 But while
Coke's views might plausibly have been cited to support that proposition,
nothing in his writings could have led anyone in America or elsewhere
to believe that he had any such notion of separation of powers as Mon-
tesquieu's: He praised Parliament, which was both a court and a legis-
lature. His attacks on the High Commission, an ecclesiastical court,"'
and on other courts and governmental agencies, were always based on
his contention that they were exercising powers which had not been
conferred on them by Parliament." He never suggested that Parliament
could not lawfully have conferred such powers, or that there was any-
thing inherently dangerous in a combination of judicial and executive
or legislative functions. Coke held that the Commissioners of Sewers
- who had jurisdiction over drainage ditches and the like - could be
pressed ;" that "he wras too fond . . . of telling untruths to support his own opinions ;"
that he "yielded to the temptation of misquoting authorities where they clashed with his
views ;" that "on the Bench he w-as always in a sense the advocate striving to force
acceptance of his opinion" and "w%-as not sufficiently aware of the need to listen to argu-
ment." See 7 & 8 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2036, n. 3, § 2250, n. 91; MacKay,
Coke-Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supremacy of Law? (1923) 22 Mica. L. Rmv.
215, 216; BIRKENHEAD, FOURTEEN ENGLISH JUDGES (1925) 37, 38, 44-46, 50; Usu cR
RisE AND FALL OF THE HIGH Commssio-N (1913) 191-92; 5 HrLuswo.m,, op. di. suPra
note 12, at 44-46, 437, 472-81; cf. Dawson, Coke and Ellesnere Disinterrcd: The Attach
on the Chancery in; 1616 (1941) 36 ILT. L. Rhv. 127, 133.
16. See, e.g., 1 JOHNsoN, THE LIFE OF SIR EnwARD CoxE (1845) 73-74, 90-92, 324-
29, 427; 2 id. at 3, 29-30, 6S, 73-88, 311-12; 5 HoLDswcTra, op. di. supra note 12, at
427-28; WmmoRE, EviDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2036, n. 3. The writer hopes, before l,ng,
to publish a book in which Coke's career will be discussed more in detail.
17. Corwin, supra note 9, at 398.
18. That the High Commission and the Star Chamber were courts and not mere
administrative agencies, see GOEBEL, CASES AND MATEFRIALS ON THE DzxEe'V.r fti
LEGok IN STITUTIoS (1937) 297; UsIRa, RISE AND F.LL LR THE HiGH Coitissx, :
(1913).
19. See, e.g., The Case of the Lords Presidents of Wales and York, 12 Cohe's
Reports 50.
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prevented by the courts from acting outside their statutory authority ;20
but their granted authority was generously interpreted, without any ob-
jection from Coke, and it included both the power to enter specific orders
(judicial power) and to make subordinate laws and ordinances (legis-
lative power) .21 His successful, but intellectually dishonest, attack on
the court of Admiralty,2 2 and his fortunately unsuccessful campaign
against the Court of Chancery did not in the least spring from an ani-
mosity toward administrative bodies, or toward the combining of govern-
mental powers in one agency. Some legal historians, with whom Chief
Justice Taney and Mr. Justice Story concur, suggest that Coke's battles
with several of the non-common-law tribunals were motivated by a
jealous)' which involved financial considerations -a desire of Coke, a
common law judge, to avoid loss of business for common law judges
whose incomes derived largely from fees paid by litigants in the common
law courts. 3
Whether or not that be true, this, undeniably, is true: Coke never even
mnurmured a protest against the notorious fact that the Privy Council and
the Star Chamber - Coke sat in both - each exercised combined judi-
cial and administrative powers of an extensive character such as no
existing American federal agency possesses, or wants to possess. Not
only did he not thus protest, but, late in life, even when he was in open
opposition to the Crown, Coke described the Star Chamber as "the most
honorable court (our Parliament excepted) that is in the Christian
world."24 And that hearty approbation of that "administrative-judicial
tribunal" is contained in Coke's Institutes which, we are told, constituted
"almost a bible when our [American] Bills of Rights were framed." If,
then, our 18th century American statesmen were influenced by Coke's
writings, they surely were not thereby induced to regard with disfavor
a governmental agency with mixed administrative, legislative and judicial
powers.2 5
20. The Case of Thester Mill Upon the River of Dee, 10 Coke's Reports 137b;
Keighley's Case, 10 Coke's Reports 139a; The Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Coke's Reports
141a; see 4 COKE'S INsT. 275-76 on "The Court of the Commissioners of Sewers."
21. Keighley's Case, 10 Coke's Reports 139a. See 10 HOLDSwonRT, HISTTRi O0
ENGLISH LAW (1938) 199-206.
22. 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 553 ff.
23. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHANCELLORS (1845) 184-85; USHER, RxsE AND FAtL
OF THE HIGH COMMISSION (1913) 55; Taylor v. Carry, 20 How. 583, 612-17 (U. S.
1857) ; Fisher v. Carey, 173 Cal. 185, 159 Pac. 577 (1916) ; cf. The Jerusalem, 13 Fed,
Cas. 559, No. 7,293 (D. Mass. 1814); Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6,047
(D. Me. 1823); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, No. 3,776 (D. Mass 1815);
I BENDICr, ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) 781, 756.
24. 4 COKE's INsT. 65.
25. Cf. Corwin, supra note 9, at 375-79; GOEBEL, CASES AND MATEPIALS O' Till,
DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1937) 758; MCILwAIN, op. cit. supra note 7,
passim.
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Whatever may have been Coke's influence at the time, certainly it is
not true that the constitutions of the American states, adopted after inde-
pendence was declared, assigned the position of top dog to the courts
or, generally, adhered to the principle of separation of powers. -0 Typical
of the inaccuracies of the thesis we are examining is the statement that,
peculiarly in Pennsylvania, ideas emanating from Coke and other English
17th century writers prior to 1688 reinforced the unfortunate experiences
of the Pennsylvania colonists with the English Privy Council so that
they "understood the need of . . . separation of powers."'- The actual
fact is that the provisions of, and the practices under, the Pennsylvania
constitution, adopted after Pennsylvania declared its independence (o
England (Benjamin Franklin being one of its authors), disclosed little
regard for any such separation of governmental powers. Madison, in The
Federalist, Nos. 47 and 48, gives a contemporary's report. He tells how,
under that Pennsylvania constitution. "cases belonging to the judiciary
department" had been "frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and
determination;" that "the executive department" consisted of so many
members so selected that "it has as much affinity to a legislative assembly
as to an executive council; '" s that under its constitution "the president,
who is the head of the executive department, is annually elected by a
vote in which the legislative department predominates," and, "in con-
junction with the executive council . . . appoints the members of the
judiciary department, and forms a court for impeachment of all officers,
judiciary as well as executive;" the "judges of the Supreme Court and
justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the legislature, and
the executive power of pardoning in certain cases" is "referred to the
same department;" and that "the members of the executive council are
made ex-officio justices of peace throughout the state." Neither the
president nor the executive council could veto acts of the legislature or
otherwise hamper it. A critic of that constitution complained that the
judiciary was wholly dependent upon the legislators "who may remove
any judge from his office without trial for anything they please tu call
'misbehavior'." 29
26. Certainly it ws not embodied in the ArtiClIs of Cni ederatiun.
27. PoUND, CON'EMPORxAy JURISTiC T EORY" (194U) 25.
28. It consisted of thirteen members, chosen every three years by the vutmr.
29. Italics supplied. See NETIELs. TnE Routs or ARI.: CiILZAI,:; 41931
666. In 1939, Pound made reference to the separation of powers in the Virginia C,nqi-
tution of 1776 (1939) 11 VA. ST.TE BaR Ass'x PreV. 372, 375. His rmarli , n tbat
subject should be compared with those of Madison in TaE: FEL uoALIST, NX. 47 (1842
ed.). He pointed out that, under that constitution, justices of county courts were eligilile
to sit in the legislature; that the chief magistrate and his executive counsel were appoint-
able by the legislature, as were all the principal officers, buth executive and judiciary;
and the executive power of pardon was in one instance vested in the legislature. In
THE FEDE-ALIST, No. 66 (1842 ed.), Hamiltwn puintcd o.ut that in New YorL- "the judiciarzy
19421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
It is true that, in that period, there was a general distrust of the
executive. But the chief check on executive power then provided by
most constitutions was not the courts, but- as in England after 1688
- a powerful legislature."0 There was "a decided hostility towards law
and lawyers."'" The pattern followed by the constitution makers of
that period was- contrary to the thesis described above- closer to
the English post-1688 conception of legislative supremacy than to earlier
English notions.82
Under many of those American state constitutions, as in Pennsyl-
vania, the legislatures exercised judicial power. Although, if Coke actu-
ally believed in judicial supremacy, he would have been horrified at what
happened under those constitutions, yet interestingly enough, that prac-
tice appears to have been, in part, the result of a state of affairs which
Coke would have applauded- the absence of courts of equity. "In the
general absence of courts of Chancery," writes Corwin, "it becane
a frequent practice in many of the states for the legislature to inter-
vene in the proceedings of the ordinary courts, annulling or modifying
their judgments, reopening private controversies and even determining
them by 'special acts'."
38
In truth, it was the subsequent conservative reaction to the exercise
of their powers by those powerful state legislatures after 1776 that later
led to the adoption, in our Federal Constitution, of devices deliberately
designed to augment both executive and judicial powers in order to
curb the legislative branch. The debates in the Constitutional Convention
make this plain. "Midison, Wilson, Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris,
Randolph and Mason spoke bluntly about their fear of the danger to
minority interests, and particularly property, from popular rule...
For bulwarks against popular tyranny, reliance was placed particularly
on the senate and executive. The importance of efficiency was urged,
particularly in connection with the executive . . . Madison's speeches
. . . indicate that his fear of the legislature and his desire for a strong
executive were fundamental .... He . . . argued strongly, from the
authority . . . in the last analysis, may with truth, be said to reside in the Senate," and
that much the same was true in New Jersey.
30. DIcxiNsON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 97-98, recognizes this fact for a moment
and then forgets it. For summaries of the constitutional provisions exalting the legis-
latives, see MERPIAm, AEimcAN POLITICAl. THEORIES (1903) 80-82; NEmrTELs, TUn
ROOTS OF AmERICAN CIVILIZATION (1938) 663 ff.
31. Compare Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law (1938) 38 COL. L.
REv. 555, 567, n. 33. Cf. Bridges v. California, 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4064, 4066 (U. S. 1941).
32. Schneider says that "our federal constitution and its amendments" are "in con-
tents and theory closer to 1689 than to 1776." Constitution and Bill of Rights il Ti;
CoNsTITuTIoN REcONSIDERED (Read's ed. 1938) 143, 155 n.
33. Judicial Review, (1932) 8 ENcYc Soc. ScIENCEs 458. Pound, in 1914, had recog-
nized these facts. See Justice According to Law (1914) 14 CoL. L. REv. 1, 7.
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danger of legislative tyranny, for the necessity of executive independence.
. . .Adams [in his Defense of the Constitution] urged the importance
of a strong executive.""4 And the same is true of The Federalist. The
obvious drive there disclosed is against the possibility of a popularly
controlled legislature: "The legislative department is everywhere extend-
ing the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex."'  . . . "We have seen that the tendency . . . is tu an aggran-
dizement of the legislative, at the expense of the other departments."'"
"The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into dif-
ferent branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and
different principles of action, as little connection with each other as the
nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the
society will admit. '
All too evident is a distrust not of executive power but of popular
government; a fear that the people, if unchecked, will use the legisla-
ture to assert their will."5 Adams,"9 Hamilton ".1 and 'Madison were
34. Sharp, Classical Anrican Doctrine of "the Separation of Powers," (1935) 2 U.
OF Cm. L. R.v. 385, 399, 420, 423, 424. See also w,, THE TWILTC;ur oP HE SU-
PrE.mE COURT (1934) 126 ff.
35. THE FEDruasT, No. 47 (1842 ed.).
36. Tim FErAmsr, No. 49 (1842 ed.).
37. THE FEDERALisT, No. 51 (1842 ed.).
38. THE FEDERALsr, Nos. 9, 10, 48, 51, 3 (1842 ed.).
39. Adams, in his DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION k1787) said: "The l'a!siwns and
desires of the majority of the representatives being in their nature imatiable ard un-
limited by any thing within their own breasts, and having nothing to control them ',,ith-
out, will crave more and more indulgence, and, as they have the power, they will have
the gratification .... The proposition that the people are the best keepers of their 4,%,n
liberties is not true. They are the worst conceivable, they are no keep ers at all; they
can neither judge, act, think, or will, as a political body. Individuals have conquerC
themselves; nations and large bodies never." Elsev here he said: "If you give more
than a share in the sovereignty to the democrats, that is. if you give them the command
or preponderance in the sovereignty, that is. the legislature, they will vote all prorcrrty
out of the hands of you aristocrats, and if they let y, tu escape wvith your lives, it will h2
more humanity, consideration, and generosity than any triumphant duo'eracy ever dis-
played since the creation. And what will follow? The aristocracy among the deniecrat,
will take your places, and treat their felows as severely and sternly as you have treated
them." Quoted in 1 PARINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS iN AmtR ,AN Ti,lRtGIIT (19 271
315-16; cf. MmE.Rum, op. cit. supra note 3U. at 12(1 ff.
40. Hamilton said: "All communities divide themsvlveb into. the few anI the
many. The first are the rich and well born, the other the mass of the ,cople. The voice
of the people has been said to be the voice of God: and, however generally this maim
has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and chang-
ing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give, therefore, to the first class a dis-
tinct, permanent share in the govermnent. They will check the unsteadiness of the
second; and, as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever
maintain good government. Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in the
mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the lublie govd? Nothing but a p~r-
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.avowedly desirous of protecting the "rich and well born" from the
"turbulent" passions of the populace.
In The Federalist, No. 10, Madison refers to "complaints . . . heard
everywhere from our most considerate and virtuous citizens . . . that
our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded
. . . and that measures are too often decided, not according to the
rules of justice and the minor party, but by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority. . . . When a majority is included
in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to sacri-
fice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights
of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against
the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object
to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great
desideratum by which alone this form of government can be'rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recom-
mended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
"By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two
only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority,
at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-
existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local
situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.
If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well
know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an
adequate control." In The Federalist, No. 51, it was said: "Different
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority
be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure.
In the debates in the Federal Constitutional Convention, it was iade
plain that suffrage must be based on property qualifications.4 1  It was
finally agreed that the Constitution should contain no such provision.
But it was provided that Senators were to be elected by the state legis-
latures, and that members of the House from each state were to be
chosen by those eligible to vote for the lower house in that state, it
being well known that the constitutions of most of the several states
required property qualifications for the suffrage.4 -
manent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their tubulent and uncontrollable
disposition requires checks." I ELLIor's DEDATES (1836) 421, 422.
41. See, e.g., Madison's remarks quoted in BEARD, AmERIcA N MII'ASSAGIE (1939)
935; note also his later views quoted by BEARD, 936-37. See MERRIAM, Op. cit. stUpra
note 30, at 84.
42. Compare THE FEDERALIST, No. 25 (1842 ed.). Popular influence on government
was to be checked, inter alia, by the indirect method of electing the President and the
Senate and the checks imposed on the House by the Senate; cf. Tim FEDERALISr, Nos.
39 & 68 (1842 ed.).
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It is beyond possible doubt that there was no desire that executive
powers should be "jealously hemmed in by constitutional limitations."
No one can plausibly so assert who reads the following excerpt from
The Federalist, No. 70 :43 "There is an idea, which is not without its
advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of
republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of
government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of founda-
tion; since they can never admit its truth, without, at the same time,
admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.
It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign at-
tacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws;
to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice;
to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambi-
tion, of faction, and of anarchy.... A feeble executive implies a
feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but anuther
phrase for a bad execution: and a government ill executed, whatever it
may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government." As Merriam
puts it, "On the whole, The Federalist's discussion of the legislative and
executive powers indicates a decided change in political theory since the
days when the legislature had been implicitly trusted and the executive
degraded and despised. There is now manifested a decided suspicit-in
of the legislative, and great anxiety as to the possible extent of its
encroachments. On the other hand, there is a strong dispositiu-i to
revive the executive department and intrust it with substantial powers.
. . . The Federalist . . . contended boldly for an energetic executive,
maintaining that this is essential to any efficient government."' "
It is a significant fact that while, in our Constitution, "the legislative
and judicial powers are carefully enumerated," yet "with respect to the
powers of the executive the language is very vague. . . .", "It is
impossible," it has been said,4" "to read that instrument, without being
forcibly struck with the loose and unguarded terms in which the powers
and duties of the President are pointed out. So far as the legislature
is concerned, the limitations of the Constitution are, perhaps, as precise
and strict as they could safely have been made; but in regard to the
executive, the convention appears to have studiously selected . . . loose
and general expressions. ." And in the Virginia debates which
43. See also THE FERv.rAsr, Nos. 48, 49, 51 & 0 (1842 ed.).
44. IMIEaIAm, op. cit. supra note 30, at 114-15.
45. Tansill, W~ar Powers of the President (1930) 45 PoL. SC. Q. 1, 2.
46. UPSHUER, A BRiEF E.Nguiy INTO THE TUi& XATU1, .i*D .%APLttT (2 t 1
FEau.D&L GovERIEIT (1863) 116. See CktRiW, Tnu TWILIGHT k-" TIM StuLro-!r
Couar (1934) c. Ill.
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led to the ratification of the Constitution, "Madison with his associates,
Randolph, John Marshall, Corbin, Johnson, Lee, Nicholas, Pendleton,
and Stephen," emphasized "the necessity for a checked legislature, and
a strong executive." 4 7
The men who were instrumental in procuring the adoption of the
Federal Constitution were prominent in the first session of Congress. In
that session, Vice-President John Adams told the Senate that it would be
unwise to address the chief executive merely as "President." There was,
he said, little dignity in a title applied to "presidents of fire companies
and cricket clubs. . . . A committee . . . recommended the title, 'His
Highness the President of the United States of America and Protector
of Their Liberties'. 48
The Constitution created an independent federal judiciary. An inde-
pendent judiciary, however, is not, necessarily, one which has the power
to declare legislation invalid, as the present status of the English courts
shows. But, although Madison's attitude on the subject was equivocal, 40
there would seem to be little doubt that the founding fathers intended
the federal courts to exercise such power." That, however, does not at
all mean that their basic purpose was to pit the courts against the execu-
tive. Instead, their basic and avowed aim was to use both courts and
executive to restrain the legislature.
But it has been suggested that the Bill of Rights in our Federal Con-
stitution, consisting of the first ten amendments, had the primary purpose
of curbing the executive. That, too, is a thesis difficult to maintain.
The Bill of Rights was adopted under the leadership of Madison who
believed in a strong executive, 1 and, in large part, under pressure from
Jefferson and his adherents. Jefferson, at that time, 2 chiefly feared
the legislative, and thought the Bill of Rights would be a "legal check"
on it, in the hands of the judges who should be independent but "kept
strictly to their own department."
8' 3
There is, above all, a fatal flaw in the effort to support any separa-
tion of powers argument solely in terms of historical influences: It is
47. Sharp, supra note 34, at 429.
48. BATES, THE STORY OF CONGRESS (1936) 8.
49. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION (1938) 32-33, 47-50.
50. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (1842 ed.) ; BEARD, THE StPRmtnn CoUtRr AN) Tnl
CONSTITUTION (1912).
51. We have already noted his attitude in the debates in Virginia on the adoption
of the Constitution; cf. THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 47, 48, 63 (1842 ed.).
52. See his letter of March 15, 1789, to Madison.
53. That Jefferson ever believed in judicial supremacy may well be doubted in the
light of his low estimate of lawyers and his subsequent tilt with Marshall. See Noel,
JEFFERSON (Home Foundation Lib. ed. 1926) 39, 41, 229-31, 268, 222; CORwIN, COURT
OVER CONSTITUTION (1938) 69; Franklin, Brutus, The American Praetor (1940) 15
TuLAxE L. REv. 16, 31, 45; Franklin, The Judiciary State (1940) 3 NAT. LAWYERS
GUILD Q. 27, 28-38.
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impossible to single out Coke, or Harrington, or Locke, or Montesquieu
or Blackstone, or any other thinker, or any combination of thinkers,
and say, "This was the influence that directed the thinking of the 18l
century Americans who framed the constitutions of that period.""
Locke was influential, but he made the legislature more powerful than
the executive or the courts; that proposal was consonant with most
of the early state constitutions, but not with the Federal Constitution.
Montesquieu's theory of a triad division of powers had some effect,.
but in diluted form;" and he opposed any power in the legislature to
impeach the executive, an idea which was embodied in our Federal
Constitution. Coke, whether or not correctly, was interpreted by the
American colonists as advocating the power of courts to strike down
unreasonable legislation; there was much praise of that idea prior to
1776, but not in most of the thirteen states, when, after independence,
they adopted their constitutions; the subsequent revival of that concept
in the Federal Constitution, and in its still later judicial interpretation,
did not derive primarily from Coke. Black-stone was undoubtedly widely
read in America after 1776, but the doctrine of legislative supremacy
which he, like Locke, espoused, while it may have influenced those who
drafted many of the early state constitutions, was later rejected by the
founding fathers who wrote our Federal Constitution. The views of
some of those Puritans who were active in Cromwell's day, both directly
and as reflected in Harrington, had their effects; from them, it can be
plausibly argued, came the ideas of a written constitution with provisions
54. Alexander Hamilton put the matter grandiloquently in 1th century terminolugy:
"The Sacred Rights of Manldnd are not to be rummaged for among old tparclunents or
musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the vhole volunie of hunan
nature, by the Hand of Divinity itself, and can never be erased or ob.curcd by mortal
powers." I WoRrs (2d ed. 1903) 113.
55. Jefferson once said of Montesquieu: "I am glad to hear of kvvrything xvhiclh
reduces that author to his just level . . ." And again: "'I had, %%ith the world, d&emv.l
Montesquieu's work of much merit; but saw in it, w ith every thinkinig man, -. mud
of paradox, of false principle and misapplied fact, as to render its value cquivueal (n
the whole." 5 JEFFERso-'s W T NGs (Washington's ed. 1853) 531), qu ted in Franklin,
The Jvdiciary State (1940) 2 NAT. LAWYrms GUILD Q. 244, 247. And he said Of tilt
Virginia county courts, which performed such non-judicial duties as ,uprvising schlk ,.-,
levying taxes, voting expenditures, and appointing sheriffs: "I acknowledge tlit .alutc
of this institution; it is in truth our principal executive and judiciar) ." u,,td in
DicyixsoN, supra note 5, at 34, n. 5. See note 29 supra. The willingne~s to vilate
Montesquien's views did not cease with the adoption of the Constitutin: "At the Very
outset of the new Government, Jay had held for six months the office of Chief Justice
and Secretary of State of the United States . . .; Ellsworth was for a year and a
half Chief Justice and Minister to France; . . . Marshall served both as Chief Justice
and Secretary of State for over a month in 18U1." 1 W.ult:, TuE St va uan Cut Lr
xx UxrrD STATES HIsToRY (2d ed. 1928) 275.
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for checks and balances; but the notion of a judiciary with power to
declare statutes unconstitutional cannot be ascribed to them.
50
Who, in truth, can say with accuracy what are the "influences" which
move men? What they have read often has some effect. But men,
particularly when creative, do not merely reproduce the thoughts of
others. Those thoughts may be provocative, stimulative. But the stimu-
lus may result not in imitation but in originality. It is the pedant, lacking
,originality himself, who assumes that there is nothing new under the
sun, that new ideas are simply the mathematical equivalent of older
ideas. Creation is more chemical than mechanical or mathematical. There
are psychological, as well as biological, "sports" and mutations. Coleridge
reads the narratives of English sea-voyages; there emerges, as Lowes
has shown, 57 a poem, containing, it is true, phrases from those old tales,
but built into a work of art which is far more than the mere product
of those borrowed words. Veblen, as Dorfman discloses, 5 scans the
pages of* anthropologists and sociologists; no one would say that The
Theory of The Leisure Class is any mere copy of what his predecessors
had said, although their ideas undoubtedly goaded his thinking. New
wine goes into old bottles, but the important fact is not the antiquity
of the bottles. More than that, often the bottles themselves are new and
only the antique labels remain.
And so with our 18th century American statesmen. Their handiwork
-so more and more intelligent historians are coming to conclude
was largely the result of their reactions to their own unique experi-
ences, first in the struggle with the English government and the colonial
governors, and later in the precarious period of difficulties between the
states in the period after independence. "Indigenous experience" says
56. See SCHNEIDER, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 147-51; SABINE, A HISTOPY OF POLITI-
CAL THEORY (1937) c. 24; 6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1924) 151-5(1;
MERRIAM, op. cit. supra note 30, at 92-93.
57. LOwEs, THE ROAD TO XANADU (2d ed. 1930) 35, 37, 48, 53, 142, 160, 427. lie
shows us how "at any moment a page which Coleridge was reading might become elec-
trical, and set free the currents of creative energy." The "shaping spirit of imagination
must have materials on which to work." But "the marshalling of a shapeless confusion
of scattered recollections into clarity, order and form"-that is the work of vital inag-
ination. "One of the most momentous functions of the imagination" is "its sublimation
of brute fact." By observing what a great man has read we can "retrace the obliter-
ated vestiges of creation." For "the imagination never operates in a vacuum. Its stuff
is always fact of some order, somehow experienced; its product is that fact transmuted."
He also says: "I hope it is clear that I do not care a rap for the question of so-called
literacy borrowing per se. The most supremely original performances . . . have sprung
into being through some electric contact of one mind with another . . ."
For other accounts of the workings of the creative imagination, see WALLAS, Tin
ART OF THOUGHT (1926); VALIRY, VARIETY (1938) 60; LEUIIA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM (1925) 241; G. N. LEwis, THE ANATOMY OF SCIENCE (1926);
PoINC , ScIENcE AND METHOD (1914); Cf. FRANK, LAW AND Tn MoDERN MiNI'
(1931) 169.
58. DORFMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND HIS AMERICA (1934).
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XWright; "autochthonous development," says Corwin, were the vital
stimuli.59  MacIver suggests that the influences of European writers
varied with varying American-attitudes which may be grouped into three
stages-the period up to 1772, that from 1772 to 1782 and that from
1782 to 1789."' In other words, as native attitudes changed under the
impact of events, so the authorities relied upon, or the weight given
to a particular authority, also changed. To find "authority" ft or a l1 ition
which they reached -accidentally or as the result of compromise or
as a product of original genius - must have been pleasing to tho se
American statesmen, as it is, at times, "to all men. Precedents often
do aid thinking; often, too, they allay inner doubts and help, as ratio-t'i-
alizations, to persuade others. But, as one notes the manner in which
our forebearers used their precedents, one recalls Kipling's lines:
"When 'Omer smote 'is bloomin' lyre
He'd 'eard men sing by land an' sea;
An' what he thought 'e might require,
'E went an' took - the same as me 1" 61
59. Wright, The Origins of the Scparati,,n ,if Powers in America (1933) 13 Eo-
NomicA 169, 176; "It is one of the inost curious facts in the history of the United States
that the legislative-executive quarrels during the colonial period convinced the colonists
of the desirability of a separation of powers rather than a union of powers . . . Doult-
less the writings of the English and French publicists who upheld the theory c-f scpara-
tion of powers played a considerable part in consolidating and strcngther-ing the Aneri-
can preference for government of this kind. So far as I can see, there is no lppsifle
way of determining just how much influence they did exert. For the mi.,,t part refer-
ences to their writings come after rather than before the constitutions werc drafted.
They seem, that is to say, to be quoted by way Qf explaining and justifying vwhat had
already been done . . . In this, the first of the great perikds of modern constituti,,n
writing, it was indigenous experience which determined the character uf the funtlamental
laws." Corwin, supra note 9. at 402. 403 ft, shows that the colonists' arguments agaio-t
the English just before and during the American Rvvlution, were "soundly lased on
autochthonous development;" each colony, it was then contended, "had its own tarlia-
ment which was the supreme law making power within its territorial limits." He cites,
as typical, the Virginia constitution where "the horn of the legislative department is
mightily exalted, that of the executive correspondingly depressed;" adding that the
judges "were the legislature's appointees, and judicial review is nowhere hinted." He
says that "in 1776 the inifluence of Cokc and Locke -was no longer the predminLant o1e
that it had been. In the very process of controversy with the British Parliament, a new.
point of view had been brought to American attention." (italics supplied I.
Cf. 'MCIL77AIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CHANGIMI, WoRau (1939) c. 10;
Mort, DuE PRocEss OF LAW (1926) 137.
60. European Doctrines and The Constitution in TuE CON'TITTvn 1ce.iWr'r[ .
(Read's ed. 1938) 51.
61. For comments on the influence of divers authorities, see also Corwin, supra
note 9, at 394, 404-05; CoRWIN, COURT OVER THE CoNsTcrIMtN. (1939) 23-24; GubJ,J
Constitutional History and Law (1938) 38 Cot. L. REv. 555, 566-67.
For seemingly inconsistent views on the subject, expressed by P,,und, see P,und.
Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 H.Rv. L. R.v. 383-92; POuNn, Coir~tc.v
JtuRsTic THEORY (1940) 25 ff; POUND. TnE FORM.ATiv EpnA or Amynir-%-. l.-w 1193
41-42; POUND, SPcIAL REPORT TO TnE Amc.xR.AN BAR Ass'n (l9381; POUND, Tur
PLAcE OF THE JTTDICrAR IN A DEMLcRTIC POLITV (1941) 133.
